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This article examines the practice and limits of judicial law reform. In particular, I consider 
the question of when initiation of a reform is appropriate for the judiciary as opposed to the 
legislature, and issue which has been a matter of controversy amongst the Justices of the 
United Kingdom Supreme Court. This question is assessed in the light of the institutional and 
constitutional competences of the courts, particularly with respect to the structure of common 
law reasoning. It is also argued that it is important to have regard to perspectives of the 
relevant judges, in understanding the individual and collective approaches to the judicial 





What are the limits of judicial law reform in the common law? This article interrogates that 
question with specific reference to recent jurisprudence of the United Kingdom Supreme Court 
(‘UKSC’),1 as an exemplar of the common law tradition. The question has also been a matter 
of considerable controversy amongst the current Justices. My focus here is on the work of the 
Supreme Court, since it is a final court of appeal,2 although we shall see that other leading UK 
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1 For more detail, see A. Paterson, Final Judgment: The Last Law Lords and the Supreme Court, Hart Publishing, 
Oxford, 2013; J. Lee, The United Kingdom Supreme Court: A Study in Judicial Reform, in E. Guinchard & M.P. 
Granger (Eds.), The New EU Judiciary: An Analysis of Current Judicial Reforms, Wolters Kluwer International, 
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2 The UKSC is the final court of appeal on almost all matters in the United Kingdom. The Supreme Court does 
not have jurisdiction appeals from Scotland on criminal law, in respect of which the High Court of Justiciary is 
the final court of appeal, except where an issue under devolution and human rights legislation is raised (see eg 
Brown v The Parole Board for Scotland, The Scottish Ministers and another (Scotland) [2017] UKSC 69, [2018] 
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judges have reflected upon the Court’s work.3 It is a striking feature of disagreements about 
judicial development of the law that the Justices will disagree not just about the outcome of a 
given case, but about the gravity of the change being made. I argue that understanding the 
rhetorical framing of common law argumentation is crucial to appreciating the capacity of the 
courts to carry out reform. Lord Neuberger, the former President of the UKSC, has emphasised 
that  
 
In a common law system, where the law is in some areas made, and the law is in 
virtually all areas developed, by judges, the doctrine of precedent, or as it is sometimes 
known stare decisis, is fundamental.4 
 
Yet this fundamental role of the doctrine of precedent brings with it ancillary requirements on 
the higher courts to be clear about the extent of their decisions and the proper limits of their 
role. 
 
In order to explore the issues, this article draws upon recent case law and extra-curial 
speeches. To illustrate the themes, I take two main case examples: Ivey v Genting Casinos,5 a 
case that considered the meanings of cheating and dishonesty in various legal contexts; and 
Newcastle upon Tyne Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v Haywood,6 which concerned the 
effective giving of notice to terminate an employment contract. These cases raise important 
points of principle and practice for the development of the law. The cases have been chosen 
from the 2017-18 year of Supreme Court decisions, for two reasons: first, to build upon, rather 
than re-tread ground covered in, the extensive literature on the topic (and my own previous 
work); and second, to reinforce my point that we must examine the perspectives of the present 
composition of the Court in order to appreciate the drivers of the courts as an engine for law 
reform.  
 
In two recent pieces, I have considered the interplay between the UK Supreme Court 
and the Law Commissions (and by extension Parliament).7 This topic is given added currency 
by the presence on the Supreme Court of Lady Hale (the Court’s current President) and Lord 
Hodge, former Commissioners at the Law Commission of England & Wales and the Scottish 
Law Commission, and two former Chairs of the Law Commission, Lords Carnwath and Lloyd-
Jones.8 In this piece, I shall address the broader question of when a change is beyond the limits 
of the judiciary, both as a matter of institutional and constitutional competence.9 
 
                                                 
3 In particular, see the caution of the Chancellor of the High Court, Sir Geoffrey Vos, in his recent Chancery Bar 
Association Annual Lecture, ‘Preserving the Integrity of the Common Law’, 16 April 2018. 
4 Willers v Joyce (No 2) [2016] UKSC 44, [4]. 
5 Ivey v Genting Casinos (UK) Ltd (t/a Crockfords) [2017] UKSC 67, [2017] 3 WLR 1212 (see section C below). 
6 [2018] UKSC 22 (see section D below). 
7 J. Lee, ‘The Etiquette of Law Reform’ in M. Dyson, J. Lee and Shona Wilson Stark (Eds.), Fifty Years of the 
Law Commissions – the Dynamics of Law Reform, Hart, Oxford, 2016; and ‘Illegality, Familiarity and the Law 
Commission’ in S Green and A Bogg (Eds.), Illegality after Patel v Mirza, Hart, Oxford, 2018.  
8 In ‘The Etiquette of Law Reform’ (n 7), I demonstrated that Supreme Court Justices who have served with the 
Law Commissions were more likely to refer to them in their judgments than Justices who had not. 
9 See section E below. 
My aim here, therefore, is to offer a contribution to the study of what Professor Paul 
Mitchell has called “the patterns of legal change”,10 in understanding the role of judges in the 
reform of the law. The common law’s ability to develop incrementally is often contrasted with 
that of codified systems:11 the former Lord Chief Justice, Lord Thomas, recently described the 
English common law as “one of the most dynamic systems [of law] in the world”.12 
Complementing the other articles in this issue, therefore I shall illuminate the dynamics of the 
common law with regard to the initiation of law reform. 
 
 
B. Traditional and Institutional Practicalities 
 
Before engaging with the selected and selective examples of recent cases, it is necessary to 
outline the framework within which the Supreme Court works with respect to its decision-
making. The Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed that lower courts are bound by decisions 
of the higher courts in England and Wales: “Decisions on points of law by more senior courts 
have to be accepted by more junior courts. Otherwise, the law becomes anarchic, and it loses 
coherence, clarity and predictability.”13 In particular, it is not open to lower courts to prefer, 
for example, a non-binding case (for example, a decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council) over a precedent which is otherwise binding on the court simply on the basis that the 
instant judge considers it a “foregone conclusion” that the higher court would follow the 
subsequent decision if it was asked.14 The Supreme Court, however, sits at the apex of the 
judicial hierarchy and is able to overrule lower courts and to depart from its own previous 
decisions, although in the latter category it is “very circumspect”15 before exercising its power 
in this respect and it will only do so sparingly.16 
 
Formally, a subsequent lower court is bound only by the ratio decidendi of a previous 
case: the ratio is the reason for deciding the case, or the legal principle to be taken away from 
it. The ratio is based on the facts which were material to the decision. A court may of course 
make further observations beyond the ratio, which are obiter dicta and not formally binding.17 
Nevertheless such comments will naturally be taken seriously by the lower courts, and have 
significant influence on the application of the law. In the context of this article,18 we are 
                                                 
10 P. Mitchell, ‘Patterns of Legal Change’, Vol 65, Current Legal Problems, 2012, 177. 
11 Lord Reed, ‘Triremes and Steamships: Scholars, Judges and the Use of the Past’, The Scrymgeour Lecture, 
University of Dundee, 30 October 2015, p.7. 
12 Lord Thomas LCJ, ‘Keeping Commercial Law up to date’, Aston University, 8 March 2017, para 3, contrasting 
the position in France (as to which see S. Rowan, ‘The New French Law of Contract’, Vol. 66, ICLQ, 2017, 805). 
13 Willers v Joyce (No 2) [2016] UKSC 44. 
14 Willers (No 2), [17]–[18], disapproving the approach, though not the outcome, of the Court of Appeal in R v 
James [2006] EWCA Crim 14, paragraph 43. 
15 Knauer v Ministry of Justice [2016] UKSC 9 per Lord Neuberger PSC and Lady Hale DPSC at [23]. 
16 Applying Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent) [1966] 1 WLR 1234, adopted for the Supreme Court in Austin 
v Mayor & Burgesses of the London Borough of Southwark [2010] UKSC 28, [25], and now to be found in United 
Kingdom Supreme Court Practice Directions 4.2.4. J. Lee, ‘A Common Law Perspective on the Binding Effect 
of Judicial Decisions: Reasoning with Precedent in the United Kingdom Supreme Court’ (n 1). 
17 A.W.B. Simpson, The Ratio Decidendi of a Case and the Doctrine of Binding Precedent, in A.G. Guest (Ed.), 
Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1961.  
18 For wider discussion of the precedent and common law reasoning, see N. Duxbury, The Nature and Authority 
of Precedent, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008; N. MacCormick, Rhetoric and the Rule of Law, 
interested in common law argumentation as a constraint (or otherwise) on judicial law reform, 
as will be seen in the discussion of the case of Ivey in the next section.  
 
The development of the law by the judiciary is dependent upon appropriate cases 
coming before the courts (at the relevant levels) and raising pertinent issues. Reform is 
therefore always contingent on ‘the incidents and accidents of litigation’.19 The Supreme Court 
generally has control over its own docket, and hears appeals on points of general public 
importance which the court ought to consider at the relevant time.20  
 
Even when permission has been granted, much will then turn on the way in which the 
case is argued, as it may turn out not to engage some of the potentially relevant issues. For 
example, in Reilly v Sandwell Metropolitan Borough Council,21 an unfair dismissal case 
concerning employee duties of disclosure, Lord Wilson gave the leading judgment, holding 
that the employee had not been unfairly dismissed. Lady Hale noted that that case “might have 
presented an opportunity for this court to consider two points of law of general public 
importance which have not been raised at this level before”, but that the way the case had 
proceeded had meant that those points were not engaged:22 nevertheless, her Ladyship briefly 
noted the pros and cons of the arguments on the relevant issues.23 Her Ladyship might be taken 
as inviting future parties to raise such challenges in a future case, specifically to the test in 
British Homes Stores Ltd v Burchell.24 Since the Court had not been invited to overrule 
previous authority, Lady Hale concluded that “It follows that the law remains as it has been for 
the last 40 years and I express no view about whether that is correct”, which is hardly an 
enthusiastic endorsement. One can find instances of the Court being reluctant to venture into 
territory beyond the remit of the instant case, and indeed some disagreements about the wisdom 
of obiter dicta. In Reyes v Al-Malki,25 Lord Sumption gave the leading judgment, but a majority 
of other Justices (Lord Wilson, Lady Hale and Lord Clarke) expressed reservations about the 
Lord Sumption’s obiter construction of article 31(1)(c) of the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations, and taking the view that the matter would be better addressed by the 
International Law Commission.26 
 
What this section shows is that the scope for judicial law reform, even in a common 
law supreme court, may be limited by a number of factors, including tradition, in terms of the 
structure of common law reasoning; practice, in terms of the doctrine of precedent; and fortuity, 
                                                 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005; J. Bell, Policy Arguments in Judicial Decisions Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 1983. 
19 J. Lee, ‘Precedent on High: The High Court of Australia and “Seriously Considered Dicta”’ on Opinions on 
High (21 August 2013) <http://blogs.unimelb.edu.au/opinionsonhigh/2013/08/21/lee-precedent-on-high>. 
20 That broad summary suffices for present purposes, although the precise approach varies depending upon the 
Court from which the matter is being appealed and the area of law, and the Court’s particular jurisdiction in respect 
of devolution matters: see generally, Supreme Court Practice Direction 1. 
21 [2018] UKSC 16; [2018] ICR 705. See also R (on the application of KM) v Cambridgeshire County Council 
[2012] UKSC 23, considered in J. Lee, ‘Fides et Ratio: Precedent in the Early Jurisprudence of the United 
Kingdom Supreme Court’ Vol. 21, European Journal of Current Legal Issues 21(1). 
22 [2018] UKSC 16 at [32].  
23 [2018] UKSC 16 at [32]–[34].  
24 British Homes Stores Ltd v Burchell (Note) [1978] ICR 303. 
25 [2017] UKSC 61, [2017] 3 WLR 923. 
26 [2017] UKSC 61, per Lord Wilson at [68] and per Lady Hale and Lord Clarke at [68]. 
in terms of the right cases coming before any court in the first place and then being appealed 
all the way to the apex of the court hierarchy. As we shall see, further constraints may apply 
on the court’s reasoning when it hears a case and the Justices are then in a position to decide 
whether to reform the law. 
 
 
C. Judicial Reform of the Test for Dishonesty: Ivey v Genting Casinos 
 
I. Facts, Decision and Controversy 
 
In Ivey v Genting Casinos, the claimant, a professional gambler, sued a casino to recover his 
purported winnings of £7.7m in the game of Punto Banco Baccarat, a card game dependent 
upon achieving a particular combination of cards. Mr Ivey had used the tactic of “edge-
sorting”, which relies on being able to observe slight differences in the backs of cards to 
identify them. His accomplice asked the croupier (the card-dealer) to rotate the relevant cards, 
on the basis of a supposed superstition, so that the he could keep track of them.27  This tactic 
gives a player an advantage in the game over the dealer and casino. The judge at first instance 
accepted that Mr Ivey genuinely believed that his approach was “legitimate gamesmanship” 
and not cheating.28 
 
It was accepted between the parties that the contract between the casino and the player 
contained an implied term not to cheat.29 It was also accepted that the test for what amounts to 
“cheating” as in the eponymous offence created by s.42 of the Gambling Act 2005,30 which 
provides (by subsection 1, so far as relevant) that “a person commits an offence if he cheats at 
gambling” and (by subsection 3) that 
 
Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1), cheating at gambling may, in 
particular, consist of actual or attempted deception or interference in connection with - 
(a)       the process by which gambling is conducted, or 
(b)       a real or virtual game, race or other event or process to which gambling relates.” 
 
The judgment was given by Lord Hughes (with whom the other Justices agreed). It was held 
that cheating does not require dishonesty,31 and that it would be “very unwise to attempt a 
definition of cheating [although no] doubt its essentials normally involve a deliberate (and not 
an accidental) act designed to gain an advantage in the play which is objectively improper, 
given the nature, parameters and rules (formal or informal) of the game under examination.”32 
It is quintessentially a jury question.33 What Mr Ivey did amounted to cheating by taking steps 
to stack the deck (though not directly by his own hand). 
                                                 
27 Ivey, [13]–[25]. A good explanation of the rules of punto banco and edge-sorting is provided by Lady Hale in 
‘Dishonesty’, Bristol Alumni Association Lecture, 23 February 2018, pp.1-3. 
28 Ivey, [27]. 
29 Ivey, [35]. 
30 Ivey, [38]. 
31 Ivey, [45]: “Although the great majority of cheating will involve something which the ordinary person (or juror) 
would describe as dishonest, this is not invariably so.” Lord Hughes also notes at [46] that there are forms of 
deception which do not amount to “cheating”, such as bluffing in poker. 
32 Ivey, [47]. 
33 Ivey, [48]. 
 It was not therefore necessary for the Court to consider what the appropriate test for 
dishonesty is. However, Lord Hughes did go on to examine the test, because it had been fully 
argued before the court and the issue was a significant one. The meaning of “dishonesty” has 
had a long and controversial history across criminal and civil law: in particular, how to deal 
with the idea that, as Lord Nicholls put it, “for the most part dishonesty is to be equated with 
conscious impropriety”.34 Broadly, it had generally been agreed that the standard for whether 
the defendant’s conduct was dishonest is objective: it is assessed by ordinary standards of 
honesty, and a defendant is not free to set his own standards of honesty.35 The more difficult 
question had been whether, once it was determined whether what the defendant did was 
objectively dishonest, in addition it should be asked whether the defendant realised that what 
he was doing would be regarded as dishonest by ordinary, honest, people. Prior to Ivey, had 
been held that in the criminal context there should be this “combined test” – the standard was 
objective, but there was then a subjective element with respect to the defendant’s appreciation 
of those objective standards. That was the test adopted for the criminal law by the Court of 
Appeal in R v Ghosh.36 It was for a time considered that the House of Lords had adopted the 
same test for dishonesty in a civil context, in respect of claims for dishonest assistance in a 
breach of trust, in the case of Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley,37 although subsequent decisions 
(somewhat creatively)38 interpreted the law to be that the test was objective in private law 
cases.39 
 
In addressing the history of the development of tests for dishonesty in Ivey, Lord 
Hughes held that  
 
there can be no logical or principled basis for the meaning of dishonesty (as distinct 
from the standards of proof by which it must be established) to differ according to 
whether it arises in a civil action or a criminal prosecution. Dishonesty is a simple, if 
occasionally imprecise, English word. It would be an affront to the law if its meaning 
differed according to the kind of proceedings in which it arose.40 
 
Having decided that there should be a single test, Lord Hughes went on to adopt the objective 
test, in a paragraph which bears quoting in full: 
 
the second leg of the test propounded in Ghosh does not correctly represent the law and 
that directions based upon it ought no longer to be given. The test of dishonesty is as 
set out by [the private law authorities]. When dishonesty is in question the fact-finding 
                                                 
34 Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v Tan [1995] 2 AC 378 at 389. 
35 A purely subjective test, sometimes called the “Robin Hood test” – because Robin Hood took from the rich to 
give to the poor – has been definitively rejected throughout the saga: see eg R v Ghosh [1982] QB 1053 per Lord 
Lane LCJ at 1064; and Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [2002] UKHL 12, [2002] 2 AC 164, per Lord Hutton at [27]. 
See also Walker v Stones [2001] QB 902, per Sir Christopher Slade at 939. 
36 [1982] QB 1053. 
37 [2002] UKHL 12, [2002] 2 AC 164. 
38 See J. Lee, ‘Fidelity in interpretation’ (n 1), pp.6-10. 
39 Barlow Clowes v Eurotrust Internationa [2005] UKPC 37, [2006] 1 WLR 1476; Abou-Rahmah v Abacha [2006] 
EWCA Civ 1492, [2007] 1 All ER (Comm) 827; and Starglade v Nash [2010] EWCA Civ 1314, [2011] Lloyd's 
Rep FC 102. 
40 Ivey, [63]. 
tribunal must first ascertain (subjectively) the actual state of the individual’s knowledge 
or belief as to the facts. The reasonableness or otherwise of his belief is a matter of 
evidence (often in practice determinative) going to whether he held the belief, but it is 
not an additional requirement that his belief must be reasonable; the question is whether 
it is genuinely held. When once his actual state of mind as to knowledge or belief as to 
facts is established, the question whether his conduct was honest or dishonest is to be 
determined by the fact-finder by applying the (objective) standards of ordinary decent 
people. There is no requirement that the defendant must appreciate that what he has 
done is, by those standards, dishonest.41 
 
The Supreme Court thus addresses the “conscious impropriety” element of the honesty inquiry 
by stating that it must be assessed in the light of what the defendant knew of the facts. That is 
the limit of the “subjective element”: there is no inquiry into whether the defendant recognised 
that his conduct contravened ordinary standards of honesty. 
 
 
II. Reaction to the Development 
 
For present purposes, the decision in Ivey is significant for two reasons: first, it settles what 
had been a controversy over the test for dishonesty in private law, by confirming the Barlow 
Clowes objective approach. Second, the Supreme Court offers strong disapproval of the Ghosh 
combined test for criminal cases, and instead restates the law as involving a single test: the 
defendant’s conduct is assessed by objective standards of honesty, in the light of what they 
knew or genuinely believed as to the relevant facts which made the conduct dishonest. This 
change is clearly an attempted reform of at least the criminal law position. But, as we have 
noted, the observations on the Ghosh test were strictly obiter: the issue for the Court was 
whether “cheating” required proof of dishonesty; only if it did would the court have had to 
consider what that appropriate test was. The Court held that that dishonesty was not required 
to “cheat”, but nevertheless went on to (purport to) restate the test for dishonesty. Does Ivey 
then settle the position for the criminal law? 
 
The initial response to Ivey has been somewhat mixed. Judicially, it has been described 
as having “clarified” the test,42 or alternatively as having moved “the tectonic plates of the legal 
firmament”,43 and has been considered in cases engaging a wide variety of legal areas, from 
tax evasion44 to professional misconduct.45 As to the merits of the approach to dishonesty, 
numerous leading criminal law academics have engaged with the case,46 and it is not my 
purpose to engage with what the test should be here: the Supreme Court has chosen the 
                                                 
41 Ivey, [74]. 
42 Ahmed v Revenue & Customs [2017] UKFTT 866 (TC). 
43 Wingate v Solicitors Regulation Authority; Solicitors Regulation Authority v Malins [2018] EWCA Civ 366 per 
Jackson LJ at [90]. 
44 Ahmed, ibid. 
45 General Medical Council v Krishnan [2017] EWHC 2892 (Admin); General Medical Council v Raychaudhuri 
[2017] EWHC 3216 (Admin); Ramasamy v Solicitors Regulation Authority [2018] EWHC 117 (Admin). 
46 M. Dyson & P. Jarvis, ‘Poison Ivey or herbal tea leaf?’, 134, LQR, 2018, p.198; G. Virgo, ‘Cheating and 
dishonesty’ Vol. 77, CLJ, 2018, p.18 and K. Laird [2018] Crim LR, p.395. Virgo (at p.21) describes Ivey as 
involving “an unacceptable expansion of the criminal jurisdiction”, while Laird says that the judgment will 
“reverberate throughout the criminal law”. 
objective test. Rather, I am interested in what the case tells us about the limitations of judicial 
law reform: Ivey has been described by Laird as “distort[ing] principles that are fundamental 
to the common law”.47 
 
Some points could certainly be made in defence of the breadth of the approach in Ivey. 
One reason for caution with respect to obiter dicta is that, if a point is not necessary to the 
court’s decision, it may either not have been fully argued or not fully considered by the court: 
neither point applied in Ivey. Further, adopting a test which is stricter towards defendants does 
not raise the prospect of successful appeals against conviction, so it is not likely to be 
productive of uncertainty in that respect.48 The question of dishonesty had been one of intense 
controversy in both criminal and civil contexts, and Ivey was unusual in engaging both a 
criminal and private law (since it was conceded that the meaning of “cheating” should be the 
same for both). However, the Court did not expressly recognise the extent of the controversy 
in the private law context,49  as a matter of both principle and precedent:50 there is therefore a 
certain irony in the Supreme Court’s attempted resolution of the issue itself raising problems 
of precedent. 
 
In Director of Public Prosecutions v Patterson,51 the Administrative Court of the 
Queen’s Bench Decision had to consider whether magistrates had been correct to dismiss two 
charges of theft on the basis that there was no case to answer. The Court held that the 
magistrates had been wrong to dismiss the charges. The case afforded the opportunity for Sir 
Brian Leveson, the President of the Queen’s Bench Division, to consider the implications of 
Ivey for the crime of theft. Speaking of Ivey, Sir Brian noted 
 
These observations were clearly obiter, and as a matter of strict precedent the court is 
bound by Ghosh, although the Court of Appeal could depart from that decision without 
the matter returning to the Supreme Court… Given the terms of the unanimous 
observations of the Supreme Court expressed by Lord Hughes, who does not shy from 
asserting that Ghosh does not correctly represent the law, it is difficult to imagine the 
Court of Appeal preferring Ghosh to Ivey in the future.52 
 
As Sir Brian Leveson says, no doubt it would be a bold Crown Court judge, or Lord or Lady 
Justice of Appeal who declined to follow Ivey on the basis of the strict doctrine of precedent. 
And yet, there is a clear tension when compared the Supreme Court’s broader pronouncements 
on the strictness of precedent, as seen in section B above. Conceptually, it is difficult for the 
Supreme Court to be able to declare that its obiter dicta are to be followed as though binding, 
for that is to cloak them with authority which properly belongs to the ratio. The observations 
of the Supreme Court are entitled to respect, but not everything in its judgment is formally 
binding.53 There is also the concern that Parliament had legislated in the general area – the 
                                                 
47 Laird (n 46) 399. 
48 Laird (n 46) 397. 
49 G. Virgo, ‘Cheating and dishonesty’ Vol. 77, CLJ, 2018, p.18 at p.20 
50 Lee, ‘Fidelity in interpretation’ (n 1). 
51 [2017] EWHC 2820 (Admin). 
52 Paterson [2017] EWHC 2820 (Admin) at [16]. 
53 Compare the position in Australia with respect to “seriously considered dicta” beyond the strict ratio: M. 
Harding & I. Malkin, ‘The High Court of Australia's Obiter Dicta and Decision-Making in the Lower Courts’, 34 
Fraud Act 2006, which, although not expressly engaged by the wording of the statute, was 
introduced on the basis that the common law, Ghosh test applied.54 
 
Overall, what Ivey reveals is that for the Supreme Court, the opportunity to make a 
desirable (or desired) change in the law may prove difficult to resist, even if the point does not 
arise precisely within the confines of the relevant case. If the Justices believe in their 
responsibility for developing the law, then they will be reluctant to leave the law to stagnate 
while waiting for a putatively perfect set of facts to engage the issue.55 This wider point is 
considered in Section E below. Before leaving Ivey, it is noteworthy that in Ivey the court was 
led in taking the bold step by Lord Hughes: although his Lordship has been willing to develop 
the criminal law,56 he has otherwise shown more caution in respect of judicial reform than his 
fellow Justices in recent cases in other areas of the law.57 
 
 
D. Noticing Controversy: Newcastle upon Tyne Hospitals NHS Foundation 
Trust v Haywood 
 
In Ivey, it was accepted that the Ghosh combined test had been the test for dishonesty: the 
controversial question was then whether it should be the test. The next case serves to 
demonstrate how the law is developed where what the law is, as well as what it should be, is 
contested. I take Newcastle upon Tyne Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v Haywood58 as an 
illustrative example, without suggesting that it is a particularly unusual case: rather, it is typical 
of disagreements over common law adjudication. 
 
In Haywood, the Supreme Court divided 3:2 over what the common law regards as the 
effective date of the written notice of termination when delivered by post.59 It was common 
ground that the law implies a term with respect to the giving of notice, but it was disputed as 
to what the content of that term was. Mrs Haywood worked in the NHS for many years, latterly 
with the Newcastle-upon-Tyne NHS Foundation Trust. In 2011, having identified her post as 
redundant, the Trust sought to terminate Mrs Haywood’s employment. The minimum notice 
period under the contract was 12 weeks: it would have been possible for the parties to make 
express provision relating to the giving of notice and its effect, but that had not occurred here. 
The Trust sent the notice of termination on 21 April. However, as the Trust knew, Mrs 
Haywood was on holiday in Egypt on annual leave from 19-27 April. The key question was 
whether the notice had taken effect before 27 April, as then the twelve weeks would expire on 
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or after 20 July 2011: that was Mrs Haywood’s 50th birthday and she would be entitled to an 
early retirement pension if made redundant from that date onwards. Mrs Haywood’s father-in-
law had collected the letter from the postal sorting office and left it at their house on 26 April. 
Mrs Haywood read the letter after her return from holiday on 27 April. The Trust argued that 
the notice was effective from the date of delivery to the recipient’s home address, relying on 
cases dating back to the 1700s; Mrs Haywood argued that it was only effective from the date 
when she actually read the letter or she had the reasonable opportunity of reading it.60 
 
The majority held that the notice was only effective from the date that Mrs Haywood 
actually received the letter. Lady Hale gave the leading judgment, rejecting the Trust’s 
argument that there was a long line of authority which supported their argument: such 
statements as the Trust could find were “scarcely… a ringing endorsement”61 or “as consistent 
with Mrs Haywood’s case as they are with the Trust’s”.62 Instead, her Ladyship took the view 
that the cases on which the Trust relied were generally landlord and tenant cases, outwith the 
employment context (and in some cases in the context of specific statutes which were not 
applicable to the instant case); whereas Mrs Haywood was able to rely on a more recent line of 
employment cases.63 Lady Black agreed with Lady Hale that the relevant authorities did not 
establish the proposition of the Trust (or the minority): “I do not think that it has been shown 
that there is a clear and long-standing common law rule that service of what Lord Briggs [(who 
dissented)] describes as an ‘ordinary civil notice’ occurs when the notice is delivered to the 
recipient’s address.”64 It was also relevant that Parliamentary intervention in the field of 
employment rights had not expressly spoken to the position: the common law rule as identified 
by the majority had “survived” and could not be taken to have “caused significant difficulty”.65 
 
In addition to their conclusion that there was no existing common law rule to the effect 
of the Trust’s argument, the majority also thought that their approach produced a better rule in 
terms of policy. Lady Hale endorsed the view that the implication of the relevant term raised 
questions of “reasonableness, fairness and the balancing of competing policy considerations”.66 
Lady Black saw “no reason” to imply the Trust’s term into an employment contract, expressly 
on the basis that there was no common law rule to the contrary. Significant in Lady Hale’s 
reasoning was that it was possible for employers to make alternative arrangements, whether by 
express provision in the contract, or by giving notice in person (and simultaneously handing 
over a letter).67 
 
Lord Briggs and Lord Lloyd-Jones dissented, with the former giving the reasoned 
judgment. For Lord Briggs, both policy and precedent pointed in favour of the Trust’s rule. 
First, in terms of authority,  
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 there has been for over two centuries a term generally implied by law into relationship 
contracts terminable on notice, namely that written notice of termination is given when 
the document containing it is duly delivered, by hand or by post, to the home (or, if 
appropriate, business) address of the intended recipient, rather than, if later, when it 
actually comes to the recipient’s attention, or when the recipient, absent at the time of 
delivery, has returned home and has had a reasonable opportunity to read it. That term 
is clearly identified by the common law authorities as the correct one.68 
 
Lord Briggs here accepted the argument of the Trust, and holds that the relevant cases involve 
“relationship contracts terminable on notice”:69 including tenancies, licences, partnerships, and 
various business contracts. Contrary to the majority’s view, the common law rule was generally 
applicable: even though the rule had developed in landlord-tenant cases, “the reasoning is not 
specific to that relationship”.70 
 
Importantly, his Lordship made clear that he believed that that line of authorities was 
sufficient on its own, but in his view policy also supported his approach:  
 
I would add that there are in my view sound reasons of policy why the implied term 
should be as I have described, to some of which I will refer in due course. But these do 
not amount even collectively to a ground for my conclusion, save in the negative sense 
that the existing law is not so defective in policy terms that it needs now to be changed. 
Rather, my conclusion is based simply upon an analysis of what the reported cases show 
that the law already is on this question.71 
 
Lord Briggs seemed to suggest that the gravity of the potential consequences for Mrs Haywood 
was a factor in the majority’s reasoning,72 but his Lordship did not believe that the facts called 
“for an anxious re-examination or development of the previous law”.73 
 
Haywood is a significant case because it illustrates the potential for disagreement on 
both what the law is and what it should be. The majority and minority take diametrically 
opposed approaches to the question, seeking to frame the matter as the law being on their side 
from the outset. This approach involves denying that the law is being reformed except by the 
other side: it is in theory more difficult to argue for a change to the law. The majority rationalise 
the authorities by considering the employment cases which are supportive of their approach to 
be directly relevant, with other cases being either distinguishable as being in a different context 
or equivocal on the point. For the minority, there is a general common law rule which applies 
across the board, except insofar as certain employment cases have been influenced by a 
different statutory context. 
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Both sides thus claim that policy and precedent are aligned in their favour which is of 
course, no coincidence: there is a reflective relationship in their respective understandings of 
the law. As Mitchell has it, in cases such as Haywood, “judicial accounts of legal history… are 
made to legitimize subsequent statements about what the law is, by making the past consistent 
with, and indeed, appear to lead inevitably to, an assertion about the present”;74 and, one might 
add, the future. So understood, the framing of the debate in Haywood shows how controversial 
judicial development of the law can be presented as consistent with the courts’ general 
conservatism with respect to precedent (as set out in Section B above). 
 
 
E. Conceptions of Competence 
 
Drawing together the themes from the above discussion, the limits of judicial law reform, and 
the presentation of a judge’s reasoning, may be understood in terms of their conceptions of two 
forms of competence: institutional and constitutional. These are related but distinct: for 
example, it may be argued that judges should be wary of entering the field of social policy or 
areas of political controversy on the basis of the institutional reasons that they are ill-equipped 
to make decisions given their expertise and the nature of adversarial litigation, and cannot 
undertake empirical research to support a change in the law.75 The alternative is an argument 
on constitutional reasons concerning the proper allocation of responsibility between the 
branches of government. It is also clear that different judges do and will have different views 
on the where the boundary is to be drawn in particular cases.76 As Lord Lloyd-Jones, a Justice 
of the Supreme Court and former Chairman of the Law Commission, has recognised,  
 
It is accepted that judges have the power to make new law… [and t]here are, no doubt, 
limits to the judicial function in this regard, although they are difficult to formulate with 
any precision.77 
 
One example of the difficulties is the defence of illegality in private law:78 The Supreme Court 
heard four cases between 2014 and 2016, displaying serial disagreement over the relevant tests 
to be applied.79 Broadly, the debate was between those who favoured a strict and clear 
application of rules and those who favoured a more nuanced, flexible approach, capable of 
taking into account the circumstances of the instant case. The latter view prevailed when the 
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saga culminated in Patel v Mirza.80 In Patel, a majority of nine Justices adopted a test that 
considers the underlying purpose of the relevant law that has been contravened, any pertinent 
public policy engaged by the case and lastly the proportionality of denying the claim given the 
illegality in question.81 This approach was influenced by the work of the English Law 
Commission, which had favoured a structured discretion and reform by judicial development 
of the law.82 Lady Hale has since reflected on the recent history of illegality as 
 
clearly an area of judge-made law where the judges had got us into a mess and 
Parliament was most unlikely to get us out of it. A thorough investigation by the Law 
Commission was a great help to us in trying to do so.83 
 
This observation highlights several considerations of relevance here: is the area one of judge-
made law (and which has been complicated by the judiciary)? Is there the prospect of legislative 
intervention? Are there relevant reform proposals (in this case by the Law Commission) which 
can inform a court’s decision? There has subsequently been some debate over the extent to 
which Patel applies across private law,84 although it seems clear that the majority’s intention 
was “to give general guidance on the topic”.85 The Supreme Court’s approach was informed 
by the work of the Law Commission, but judicial reform leaves different uncertainties as to 
scope when compared to legislative reform. The common law usually proceeds incrementally, 
rather than implementing wider systemic reforms. 
 
Patel is one of several instances signs of the Justices of the Supreme Court being willing 
to develop the law, especially where there has been Parliamentary “failure to take up judicial 
invitations, indeed judicial pleas”86 to enact legislation: the rights of unmarried cohabiting 
couples is another.87 Lord Neuberger has said that, although “it is important for a judge to know 
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when to stand back and leave policy-based developments in the law to the legislature”,88 there 
is a safeguard in the possibility of legislative intervention. For, 
 
if a judge makes a policy-based decision with which the legislature is not happy, the 
remedy in a system with parliamentary supremacy, such as we enjoy in the UK, lies 
with Parliament. Any decision made by a court can always be reversed by the 
legislature.89 
 
For this reason, Professor Burrows has argued that the judiciary should be willing to develop 
the law when the opportunity arises, as Parliament can always intervene to correct them.90 Lord 
Neuberger noted in the context of cohabitation “the absence of such legislation leaves the 
judiciary freer to do what seems right to them, albeit very much within limits”.91 Similarly, 
Lord Reed has said that “Where modernising legislation is absent, the development of the law 
becomes an important responsibility of the courts, within the limits of their constitutional and 
institutional competence”.92  
 
This formulation casts a duty on the courts: what Lord Toulson called “the responsibility 
of the courts for dealing with defects in the common law”,93 although recognising that departing 
from previous decisions “is never a step taken lightly”.94 And judges’ understanding of the 
responsibility of the courts may evolve as during the Brexit transition: as Lord Thomas, the 
former Lord Chief Justice has recognised, “Parliament will be engaged for some years in Brexit 
and related issues”.95 On this view, the courts should be more willing to play an active role in 
developing the law in other areas. Even if, ideally, a change should be made by the legislature, 
Parliamentary inertia invites the judiciary to take on the task of reform. 
 
However, in some cases, the Justices recognise that some changes to the law may be 
more appropriately effected by Parliament, ideally after consideration by the Law 
Commission:96 what is not clear is when such a change counts as more appropriate for 
Parliament rather than by the courts.97 One relevant factor seems to be where there are current 
proposals for law reform, that may be a reason for the courts to exercise self-restraint in 
developing the law. An example of this approach is the Scots appeal of Gordon v Campbell 
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Riddell Breeze Paterson,98 which concerned when the clock started on a prescription period in 
a breach of contract claim. The trustees alleged that their solicitors had breached their 
contractual duties to exercise skill and care in respect of dealings with the abortive termination 
of leases on land owned by the trust. It was held that the limitation period started when the 
trustees suffered loss – in incurring legal fees in respect of an application to the Scottish Land 
Court – and not when the trustees realised that they had a claim after their application to the 
Land Court failed. The prescription clock had therefore started more than five years before the 
claim was brought and so the action was prescribed. Lord Hodge recognised that this result 
indicated that the distinction between financial loss and “observable damage to…physical 
property”99 and that “hard cases may be more common than it was previously thought”.100  But 
his Lordship went on to note that there were “live proposals for law reform”,101 as the Scottish 
Law Commission has published its Report on Prescription:102 the reform would change the law 
so as to provide that the clock would only begin to run when the pursuer becomes aware of 
“the factual cause of loss by an act or omission”.103 Lord Hodge recognised that the Scottish 
Government had announced its intention to bring forward legislative proposals based on the 
Commission’s recommendations. Thus, 
 
It will be the task of the Members of the Scottish Parliament to decide whether they 
agree with the Scottish Law Commission’s recommendation for the reform of the 
discoverability test achieves a fair balance between the interests of the creditor and the 
debtor in the obligation to make reparation.104 
 
The primary focus for Lord Hodge was the proper construction of the statute. However, implicit 
in the quoted paragraph is the consideration that, even if the preferred interpretation gives rise 
to awkward or harsh applications, it is not for the courts to pre-empt live proposals for law 
reform (and indeed, the court may be reassured that a position regarded as unsatisfactory may 
soon be corrected). The judgment of the correct balance of fairness between debtor and creditor 
is properly one for the legislature.  
 
The Chancellor of the High Court, Sir Geoffrey Vos, has recently expressed concerns 
about the willingness of UKSC Justices to develop the law judicially: 
 
I think the integrity of the common law would be better preserved and enhanced if all 
our courts were to allow it to develop in the ways that it always has.  I am not 
counselling some form of extreme judicial conservatism – far from it.  But nonetheless, 
a measure of judicial restraint remains, I think, desirable.105 
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 The Chancellor “detected a greater willingness amongst modern judges to throw away the rule 
book”.106 These points are framed in strong terms, and indicate another significant aspect to 
the judicial development of the law: if the Supreme Court is to insist upon strict adherence to 
precedent, is it beholden on the Justices to retain their traditional circumspection107 with respect 
to the development of the law? Although, as we have seen, it is possible to identify what the 
Court sees as relevant considerations when determining whether it is appropriate to develop 
the law at all, and if so, in a particular direction, it is more difficult to predict the weight that 
will be given to those considerations in any given case.108 The risk then is that the values of 





The analysis in this article has demonstrated that the Justices of the Supreme Court share a 
commitment to observing the boundaries of proper judicial development of the law, as 
manifested in the language of their judgments. Lord Mance, the Deputy President of the 
Supreme Court has spoken of the “discipline” of judging:110  
 
The attitudes and values with which judges approach their work is… central to the 
judicial role. I have already mentioned some [disciplinary] controls on judicial excess 
or exuberance: loyalty, precedent and methodology.111 
 
It is clear that the Justices’ shared commitment to this discipline of judging is intellectual rather 
than being merely rhetorical. The doctrine of precedent both facilitates and constraints judicial 
law reform: Ivey demonstrated that judicial enthusiasm to seize an opportunity to reform the 
law can sometimes burst free of such restrictions. Although there is a consensus that there is a 
boundary of appropriate judicial development, there does not seem to be a consensus as to 
where it should be drawn. As Haywood showed, the drawing of that boundary by individual 
judges is closely linked to their views of the substantive outcome of the relevant case, which is 
perhaps to be expected in a superior appellate court where cases are necessarily 
controversial.112 I have argued that the debate over law reform in, and by, the Supreme Court 
is not just about the merits of particular cases, but also a product of different conceptions of the 
judicial role, both individual and collective. 
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